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Snow White and the Wicked Queen submit the
fairness question to binding arbitration.
I. INTRODUCTION
The question that I have been asked by the Symposium Editors is
whether "privacy is possible in online ADR." Of course, privacy is possible,
if in the context of online alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The
confidentiality of ADR proceedings may be through encryption, which may
prevent the interception or render intercepted data meaningless; laws which
prohibit the interception of electronic communications; and confidentiality
agreements, which may prevent the parties to the arbitration from disclosing
the arbitral process or award.
Implicit in the question is the assumption that privacy has some value in
online dispute resolution. This leads to the more interesting question: when is
privacy in an ADR proceeding justified? ADR purists and ADR utilitarianists
may reach different answers to this question. As a cyberscholar, I tend
towards the utilitarian perspective. A utilitarian approach to ADR in the ever
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changing e-context must be eclectic. The challenge is to merge
characteristics such as "due process," a "level playing field," and "neutral
adjudication" (the best of the state court system) with the flexibility,
informality, and responsiveness to the needs of the parties (the best of the
ADR system), and so to create a paradigm of dispute resolution that meets
the needs of e-commerce. I analyze ADR as a practical instrument to resolve
the rather messy problems that "the law of places" may impose on the "the
world of messages." Jurisdictional questions2 and the problem of forum non
conveniens 3 render the existing state court system irrelevant, as a practical
matter, to resolve most e-commerce disputes, especially in the consumer
versus e-merchant context. Further, nation-states already are preparing to
abandon conventional dispute resolution techniques in cyberspace and
encouraging the development of ADR as a means of online dispute
resolution.4 In the long run, ADR may not surrogate to the state courts, but in
the e-context, eventually supplement it, surpass it, and ultimately largely
replace or displace the state court paradigm as the primary means for formal
binding resolution of online disputes.
First, I must concede that my introduction may be a bit misleading, that
although I use the generic term "ADR," I will limit myself to discussing
binding arbitration.5 Second, many of the problems that identified
presentation are not unique e-commerce. Most are short comings of the
2 See Yvonne A. Tamayo, Who? What? When? Where?: Personal Jurisdiction and
the World Wide Web, 4 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 7, M 9-10 (Spring 1998)
<http://www.richmond.edu/-jolt/v4i3/tamayo.html>; see also Bensusan Restaurant Corp.
v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
3 See, e.g., Alejandro E. Almaguer & Roland W. Baggott II, Note, Shaping New
Legal Frontiers: Dispute Resolution for the Internet, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 711,
712-13 (1998); see also GTE New Media Servs., Inc., v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d
1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
4 See Office of the Whitehouse, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce:
Uniform Commercial Code for Electronic Commerce (visited Apr. 8, 2000)
<http://www.ecommerce.gov/framewrk.htm#3>; see also e-Europe: An Information
Society for All Progress Report (visited May 5, 2000) <http://europa.eu.intI
comm/information_society/eeurope/pdf/progrepen.pdf> (encouraging alternative
consumer redress mechanisms, online dispute settlement, and "link[ing] of existing
alternative dispute resolution schemes in a pan-European network (European Extra-
Judicial network - EEJ-net)" for the 15 nation European Union).
5 There are many reasons for this precise focus. Binding arbitration transforms an
informal process into a quasi-judicial process that concludes in a formal state court
judgment that is entitled to be enforced. Courts enforce arbitral awards that would be
totally illegitimate had the award been initially the result of judicial proceedings.
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consumer arbitral process, whether the arbitration is virtual or in person.6
What I do assert is that because the Internet is a contract-making machine,
because of the inherent difficulties of creating formal state-sponsored dispute
resolution mechanisms,7 and because of the modem trend rendering all
disputes, whether statutory or contractual, as subject to arbitration,8 the
dangers of arbitration to consumers are both quantitatively and qualitatively
different in the online context. Unlike in the real world where there is a
strong tradition of seeking remedies in the state sponsored courts, there is no
such tradition in e-commerce.
The tentative online legal paths that we establish today may become the
settled expectations of tomorrow and ultimately affirmatively enshrined into
state law in the future. Since e-commerce norms are largely tabla rasa, this is
the appropriate time to examine critically real world institutions and import
into the online world those institutions which meet existing and future needs
for fairness and efficiency. This Article examines the role of "privacy" in
arbitration in the land of places and what its role should be in a world of
messages.
II. WHY PRIVACY IN ONLINE ADR?
Consumer privacy interests in cyberspace are important, but
countervailing public interests may require disclosure of online arbitral
proceedings or, at least, the arbitral award. The possibility of keeping the
arbitral process and award private is one of the elements of alternative
dispute resolution that separates it from the public courts, which are
presumptively open to the public. Frequently, institutions and individuals
choose arbitration solely in the hope of keeping some facts private. 9 This
secrecy is sanctioned for numerous reasons, one of which is that the public
generally has no interest in the resolution of a private dispute. If the dispute
arises out of a contract, private law creates the private ordering of parties
who selected a private method of resolving their dispute. But, if the dispute
6 Cf. Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. RaV. 1359; Richard C.
Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory ofAlternative Dispute Resolution,
85 CAL. L. REV. 577 (1997).
7 See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Rusticum Judicum? Private "Courts" Enforcing
Private Law and Public Rights: Regulating Virtual Arbitration in Cyberspace, 24 OHIo
N.U. L. REV. 769,775-78 (1998).
8 Eric James Fuglsang, Comment, The Arbitrability Of Domestic Antitrust
Disputes: Where Does The Law Stand?, 46 DEPAULL. REV. 779, 807-08 (1997).
9 See Frank A. Cona, Application of Online Systems in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 45 BUFF. L. RaV. 975, 984 (1997).
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involves the interests of more than the actual parties, for example the
arbitration of a hybrid statutory and contract claim, then privacy interests in
the arbitration must be weighed against the public's interest in the
arbitration. 10
In the world of matter and geographically defined sovereignties,
arbitration is an alternative form of dispute resolution to the state sponsored
courts. In the world of bytes and overlapping and conflicting sovereignties,
state sponsored judicial dispute resolution may become the alternative to the
new dominant paradigm of binding arbitration. As arbitration supplants the
public judicial processes, one must consider those aspects of the judicial
process that should be public even if the judicial process is an arbitral
proceeding. If adjudication solely affects the interests of the parties before
the arbitrator, then a perfectly confidential procedure is justified. But as the
interests of the public are implicated, then the public has a correspondingly
greater right to disclosure.
As arbitration begins to define public (statutory) rights or interpret
standardized forms (which have the nature of being private legislation
running against all the world), the arbitrator and the arbitral institution1
should consider making at least the award, if not the arbitral proceeding,
open. While absent a contractual obligation to do so, prior arbitral awards are
not binding in future disputes, a wise arbitrator will consider a well-reasoned
opinion of a prior arbitrator as part of the process of interpreting the disputed
10 This balancing of privacy with public disclosure is not new. For example, section
105 of the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 permits the parties to a patent
interference claim to arbitrate their dispute, but before the award is enforceable, the
Commissioner of the United States Patent and Trademark Office must be notified of the
award. See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 § 105, 35 U.S.C. § 135(d) (1994).
Surprisingly, while the Commissioner must be notified of the award, there is no
requirement that the arbitrator issue a reasoned award. See 2 PETER D. ROSENBERG,
PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 10.07 (2d ed. 1980).
111 assume most arbitration in cyberspace will be institutional rather than ad hoc.
Already arbitral institutions are crafting rules to govern consumer disputes. See, e.g.,
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Resolving Consumer Disputes: Due Process Protocol Protects
Consumer Rights, DiSP. RESOL. 3., Aug. 1998, at 8, 8; Better Business Bureau, Better
Business Bureau Dispute Resolution (visited Apr. 8, 2000) <http://www.bbb.org/
complaints/ bindarb.html>. See generally New JAMS/ENDISPUTE Policy on
Procedural Fairness in Consumer Disputes, 9 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 177
(1998). In addition, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) has already accredited three institutions to administer arbitration over
Internet domain names. See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(visited Apr. 20, 2000) <http://www.icann.orgludrp/udrp-schedule.htm>. The three
organizations are the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the National
Arbitration Forum (NAF), and e-Resolution (DeC). Id.
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term in a future arbitration. 12 If this body of "precedent" does exist, it may
crystallize into the customary law of the contract or the industry. If arbitral
awards are going to become "precedent" for a "common law" or "customary
law" of global e-commerce,13 then they must be public and well-reasoned,
lest institutional repeat players selectively choose which arbitral opinions or
awards to release to the public and which to keep secret, 14 and so distort the
developing "law" of e-commerce. Finally, arbitrators are neutrals, but they
are also human, and as such they have certain propensities, and absent
public-reasoned awards, institutional repeat players may develop special
competency in arbitrator-shopping so as to tilt the lopsided playing field
against the one-time consumer grievant.
III. PRIVACY IS PossBLE IN ONLmE ARBITRATION
The private nature of the arbitral process may be protected through the
use of technology and the judicious use of public law and the private law of
contracts. 15 The term "code" has several meanings in the e-context, as
follows:16 first, code as in the software and hardware that provides for the
interconnectivity that is the Internet; 17 second, code as in the public laws of
12 See Calvin William Sharpe, NLRB Deferral to Grievance-Arbitration: A
General Theory, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 595, 627 & n.265 (1987). See Alan Scott Rau,
Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. Tnx. L. REv. 485, 536 (1997) ("reasoned opinions
will be increasingly relied on both by disputants and by subsequent arbitrators-so
that despite a general understanding that stare decisis does not operate here, a sort of
'common law' may emerge").
13 One of the goals of online arbitration has been to create a customary law of
cyberspace through the use of well-reasoned, persuasive, arbitral awards. See
Almaguer & Baggott, supra note 3, at 721-22; Rau, supra note 12, at 537
("Opinions may be equally useful for parties to standardized transactions that may be
expected to give rise to a number of similar and often-recurring disputes .... ").
14 Cf Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95, 101-04 (1974) (commenting on
methods used by repeat players to manipulate the creation of legal rules through the
selection of which cases to litigate and which to settle).
15 Although most of the contracts to arbitrate that will take place as part of e-
commerce will be mass-market shrinkwrap, click-wrap, or similar contracts of adhesion,
they are enforceable. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997); Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice Through
Binding Arbitration of Future Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts or a Trap for the
Unwary Consumer?, 5 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 112, 112 (1993).
16 See LAWRENCE LESSiG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 20-21 (1999).
17 See id. at 6.
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the jurisdictions that the Internet envelops; 18 and, finally, code as in the
private ordering of individuals, either through settled expectations,
customary behavior, or that created through the private law of contracts. 19
Because compliance with the software and hardware codes of the Internet is
implacable and merciless in its exacting requirements, this Article will
discuss technological solutions to the privacy problem first and then proceed
to discuss the legal solutions.
A. Technology
E-commerce merchants are well aware of the risks of doing business
online. The problems facing the online arbitrator are similar to the problems
facing the e-merchant. The arbitrator must be concerned with unauthorized
access, 20 data alteration, 21 monitoring, 22 spoofing,23 service denial, 24 and
repudiation.25 Technology used to solve these problems for commercial
entities may meet the needs of the online arbitrator. Already, there are
arbitral institutions providing online arbitration, and some of these
institutions have taken steps to assure the confidentiality of the
communications. 26
The parties should consider this issue in their submission.27 Arbitral
institutions should provide guidance on the use of encryption technology.
18 See id.
19 See Gibbons, supra note 7, at 776.
20 "Unauthorized access: Someone accesses or misuses a computer system to
intercept transmissions and steal sensitive information." Netscape, Securing Your Site for
E-Commerce (visited Apr. 8, 2000) <http://www.netscape.com/security/securesites/
ecommerce.html>.
21 "Data alteration: The content of an e-commerce transaction-user names, credit
card numbers, and dollar amounts-is altered en route." Id.
22 "Monitoring: A hacker eavesdrops on confidential information." Id.
23 "Spoofing: A virtual vandal creates a fake site masquerading ... as yours to steal
data from unsuspecting customers or just disrupt your business." Id.
24 
"Service denial: An attacker shuts down [a] site or denies access to visitors." Id.
25 "Repudiation: A party to an online purchase denies that the transaction occurred
or was authorized." Id.
26 CyberTribunal, for example, has the computer equipment necessary to provide a
guarantee of perfect confidentiality to those who take advantage of its services. Thus, for
example, the information related to each case will be accessible to only the parties
concerned, the Secretariat, and the mediator or the arbitrator. See Verio, The New World
of Business: Security Solutions (visited Apr. 8, 2000) <http://www.cybertribunal.com>.
27 Because arbitration is a creature of contract, the submission defines the power
(jurisdiction) of the arbitrator, selects the "question" or "issue" presented and the
[V/oi. 15:3 2000]
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Ultimately, because of the rate at which this technology changes the choice
of encryption technology, it should be left to the arbitrator.28
B. Legal Environment
Because of the potentially transnational nature of cyberspace, the laws of
many different jurisdictions may protect all or part of the arbitral
communication. 29 There are at least two legal regimes that may protect the
confidentiality of an e-arbitration. 30 The first regime is contained within
public laws, which prohibit third-party interception of electronic
communications. The second is given form by private laws that the arbitrator,
arbitral institution, and the parties to the arbitration will make to govern the
arbitral process, and which will prohibit the private dissemination of
information regarding the arbitration. Both regimes are required to begin to
create an effective law of privacy to govern the arbitral process.
1. Electronic Crime Laws
There are many different legal regimes which may impose criminal or
civil penalties for the unauthorized access or interception of confidential
arbitral processes. This subpart will describe briefly describe the following
two paradigmatic approaches: first, the federal Electronic Communications
potential scope of the remedy to the arbitration. See Malecki v. Burnham , 435 A.2d
13, 14 (Conn. 1980).
28 Because of the rate at which Internet technology is evolving, this Article does not
discuss any specific technology in any detail, under the assumption frequently borne out
by experience that the technical discussion in a law review is frequently only of historical
interest once the article is published.
29 See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self-
Regulation, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 475, 489 (1997). As I have previously
observed,
Dynamic routing may deliver a message or even parts of the same message by
taking different routes to the destination, depending on the most efficient path.... A
message sent via e-mail from Berkeley, California to Seattle, Washington is
frequently routed: Berkeley, to Santa Clara, to Washington, D.C., to New York, to
Cleveland, to Chicago, to San Francisco, to Seattle.
Id. 30 To the degree that there are laws that may recognize that the content of the
communication has independent value and that protect the content of the communication,
then in this context there may be other regimes to protect e-arbitration. See, e.g,
Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETMON LAW § 41 (1995). A discussion of these
laws is outside the scope of this Article.
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Privacy Act and then, some thematic principles frequently found in state
computer fraud or computer abuse acts.
a. Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Perhaps the most important federal law protecting online
communications is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA).31 The ECPA protects wire, oral, and electronic communication. 32
Electronic communication is any "transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical systems that
affects interstate commerce. '33 The ECPA treats the interception of "data" in
transmission differently from stored data.34 Generally, under the ECPA, the
interception of data is treated more seriously than unauthorized access or
disclosure of the data. For the purposes of this discussion, these differences
are not significant. Suffice it to say that unauthorized interception or access
could result in severe criminal penalties, civil damages, and injunctive relief.
b. State Laws
States are prosecuting computer crimes aggressively, and unauthorized
access or interception of the online arbitral proceeding probably would
violate one or more state laws.
Since Florida adopted the first specialized state computer crime statute in
1978, almost every other state has adopted some criminal provision to protect
computer technology. 35 State laws tend to address technology-specific issues
involving computer crime. For example, generally state laws expand
common law definitions of property to provide explicit protection for
computer data.36 In addition to punishing cyber-vandalism, the altering or
destruction of data, states also explicitly prohibit an individual from
knowingly using or accessing the system beyond the scope (permission)
given that individual. In some sense, this might be considered the cyberian
31 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1994 & Supp. IV 1993).
32 See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 460
(5th Cir. 1994).
33 18 U.S.C. § 2510(a).
34 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
35 See Xan Raskin & Jeannie Schaldach-Paiva, Computer Crimes, 33 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 541, 563-65 & n.153 (1996).
36 See id. at 564-66; see also Anne W. Branscomb, Rogue Computer Programs and
Computer Rouges: Tailoring the Punishment to Fit the Crime, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 1, 32-36 (1990).
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equivalent of a prohibition of "trespassing." Some of these access statutes
explicitly prohibit cyber-voyeurism, the accessing and viewing of the data
even if the data is unaltered and the voyeur takes no action in regard to using
the data.37 In addition to criminal penalties, some state laws explicitly
provide for civil causes of action.38
2. Confidentiality Agreements
Although there is no presumption that any given arbitral process will be
kept confidential, there are several possible sources of law that can protect
the confidentiality of the arbitral process. Parties to the arbitration may agree
expressly to a confidentiality clause in the arbitration agreement. 39 The rules
of the arbitral institution may so require. ° Or, the default rules of the situs of
the arbitration may so require.4 1 Under any of the above sources of law, the
parties are free to contract for some confidentiality provisions, to protect the
relevant interests of the parties to the arbitration.42 Disputes arising out of the
breach of the confidentiality of the arbitration provision may be relitigated
before the same arbitrator as a continuation of the earlier dispute or
incidental to the effectuation of the remedy; they may be the source of future
arbitrations, or they may serve even as a dependent or independent basis on
which to commence proceedings in a state court.43
37 See Branscomb, supra note 36, at 36; Raskin & Schaldach-Paiva, supra note 31,
at 573, 566 n.170 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 569.095(5) (Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 61-
3C-12 (1992)).
38 See Raskin & Schaldach-Paiva, supra note 35, at 564 & n.160.
39 See Hans Bagner, Confidentiality in Arbitration, INT'L ARB. REP., Jan. 1999, at
18, 18.
40 See, e.g., ARBITRATION RULES FOR COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Rule 15 (American
Arbitration Ass'n 1993) ("The arbitrator shall maintain the privacy of the hearings unless
the law provides to the contrary"); UNCMTRAL ARBITRATION RULES Arts. 25, 4 and 32,
5 (United Nations Comm'n on Int'l Trade 1976) (providing, respectively, that
"[h]earings shall be held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise," and that "tihe
award may be made public only with the consent of both parties"); WIPO ARBrrRATON
RULES Arts. 73-76 (World Intellectual Property Org. 1994).
41 See Bagner, supra note 39, at 19-20.
42 Obviously, there may need to be some disclosure of the arbitral award. If
company A's distributors receive a cease and desist letter from company B alleging that
A is infringing B's intellectual property rights, and the arbitrator resolving the dispute
between A & B finds that there is no infringement, A must be able to notify A's
distributors of the arbitral award. Depending on the facts, A also may need to provide the
distributors with additional information.
43 For example, contracts may contain terms that courts normally would not enforce
under traditional contract principles such as "fraud," "unconscionability," or "unfair
surprise." Whether such challenges to the contract are for the court or the arbitrator
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C. Existing Technology and Laws Adequately Protect the Possibility of
Confidential Arbitral Proceedings
Strong encryption provides a strong powerful code on which to build
confidentiality into arbitral proceedings. To the degree that the human
element weakens the technological protection provided by encryption, at
least in the United States and in many individual states, there is strong legal
protection against unauthorized interception. Statutory prohibitions against
computer crimes provide for significant legal penalties, terms of
imprisonment, fines, and other criminal sanctions. There is also the
possibility for civil damages, both actual and punitive, to deter unauthorized
or unlawful interception or disclosure of protected arbitral communications.
Finally, parties to the arbitration may control disclosure among themselves
through legally enforceable confidentiality agreements. Consequently, the
dangers of unauthorized interception or disclosure of a cyberspace arbitral
proceeding seem to be no greater than if that same proceeding took place
offline in the more traditional room.
IV. THE PARTIES RIGHT TO ARBITRAL PRIVACY VERSUS
THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW
Traditionally, the public had little interest in learning about private
disputes between private parties, so disputes and their resolution remained
private unless the parties made the dispute a matter of public concern by
seeking the intervention of a judge and the use of state power to resolve that
dispute. This Part considers whether the private law arbitration model is
appropriate where mass market contracts (licenses) are at issue, with
numerous consumers having the same terms in their contract, giving them an
interest in how these terms are interpreted and enforced through arbitral
proceedings.
to decide is in dispute. Compare First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938, 943-44 (1995) with Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manf. Co., 388 U.S.
395 (1967). Unfortunately, if the scope of the arbitration is submitted to the
arbitrator, arbitrators are not bound to apply the law of any specific jurisdiction, and
arbitration awards are not reviewable for errors of law or fact unless the arbitration
demonstrates a manifest disregard for the law. See Glennon v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132 (6th Cir. 1996); JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION wITH FORMS § 20.12 (2d ed. 1990). See generally Stephen L Hayford,
A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between
Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
443, 449-89 (1998)(discussing statutory and non-statutory grounds for vacating an
arbitration award).
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A. Traditional Model of Arbitration
The traditional model of arbitration was the resolution of a private
dispute between two parties. Most often, the dispute arose out of the private
ordering of the relationship between the parties through a bargained-for
contract. The parties, having created the private law governing their
relationship, often also provided for the resolution of disputes arising out of
the relationship through private adjudication. Parties may agree upon private
adjudication (the "arbitration clause") either in the contract creating the
initial ordering or in a subsequent agreement to resolve the dispute privately.
Further, the disputes tended to arise between parties of relatively equal
bargaining power, each of whom had a desire to maintain an ongoing
relationship that grew out of a negotiated, bargained-for contract. Since the
parties were usually of relatively equal strength and sophistication, they were
able to game the risks and rewards of arbitration versus state court
adjudication. Further, assuming that these sophisticated parties to arbitration
agreements entered into the agreement to arbitrate in good faith, neither party
knew ex ante on which side of the arbitral processes it would be. Therefore,
in a Rawlsian sense, they bargained for a level playing field.44
The future parties to the arbitration knew the rules of the institution they
selected to administer the arbitration and generally provided for the selection
of the arbitrator. With neither side knowing the issue on which arbitration
would be demanded, each had an incentive to create a process designed to
produce a neutral arbitrator. There were many methods of selecting an
arbitrator. Perhaps one of the most common was the arbitral institution
providing a list of names, with each party striking names until whoever was
left would be the arbitrator. The process of choosing an arbitrator under this
system is characterized by informational symmetry. In the traditional
arbitration, parties have similar information symmetry regarding arbitrator
propensities, biases, and prejudices based on prior experience with the
arbitrator or the arbitrator's reputation in the community.45 Both sides are
equipped with sufficient information to strike the arbitrators who appear to
have the strongest propensity to favor the other side.
"See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-12 (1971).
45 1 am not using terms like bias or prejudice in an invidious sense. The fact that
under similar circumstances an arbitrator has ruled in favor of one party may be
significant, particularly in future cases involving similar facts. Or, depending on a party's
case, she may prefer an arbitrator who is more or less formal, or who applies procedural
rules aggressively rather than reaching issues on the merits. These are human factors that
may tilt the playing field in favor of one party, and in the case of repeat players, give
them the house advantage. See infra note 47 (discussing "house advantage").
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Finally, while neutral, an arbitrator is an individual who makes his living
by private adjudication. The parties before the arbitrator are paying for her
services. These are clients that must be kept happy. For some, this leads to a
perception that arbitrators try to halve the dispute, that is, to give something
to each of the parties appearing before the arbitrator.46 Each party to a
traditional arbitration dispute is more or less equally likely to engage the
arbitrator in the future for additional services, thus potentially keeping in
balance the arbitrator's personal interests in future employment and the
parties' interest in neutral adjudication of the dispute.47
B. New Online Model of Arbitration
The new online model of arbitration most likely will involve disparate
power relationships. Sophisticated, large, e-commerce institutions with well-
written mass market contracts containing ad terrorem terms that few state
sponsored courts would enforce may be presented to individuals who then
will not have a realistic opportunity to bargain or reject them.48
Unsophisticated consumers will not realize the significance of an arbitration
clause, for several reasons. Consumers do not purchase goods or services
with the anticipation of receiving defective goods or services and thus
foresee no need for a "legal" remedy.49 Consumers may not realize the
significance of a contract term such as, "any dispute will be resolved under
the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce. '50 Innocuous terms
such as these may cost consumers significant legal rights.
46 See Rau, supra note 12, at 520.
47 "[I]n continuing arbitrations between two repeat players, offsetting biases
may themselves prevent too great a distortion of judgment." Rau, supra note XX, at
524.
48 Unbargained for contracts tend be drafted from the gray edge of the legally
permissible and often into the realm of terror, because there is no countervailing
normative force and because these contracts will often remain either unread or
untested in the courts. Cf. William T. Vukowich, Lawyers and the Standard Form
Contract System: A Model Rule That Should Have Been, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS
799, 827 (1993); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1172, 1222, 1224 (1984).
49 See Paul Slovic, Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 465, 465 (Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
50 Cf. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
[Vol. 15:3 20001
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For example, in Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., the contract was an
enclosure with other packing materials that accompanied the computer.51 The
arbitration agreement read as follows:
Any dispute or controversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement
or its interpretation shall be settled exclusively and finally by arbitration.
The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the Rules of
Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce
[(ICC)]. The arbitration shall be conducted in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.
before a sole arbitrator. Any award rendered in any such arbitration
proceeding shall be final and binding on each of the parties, and judgment
may be entered thereon in a court of competent jurisdiction.52
The terms failed to communicate to the consumer that
the cost of ICC arbitration [is] prohibitive, particularly given the amount of
the typical consumer claim involved. For example, a claim of less than
$50,000 require[s] advance fees of $4,000 (more than the cost of most
Gateway products), of which the $2000 registration fee [is] nonrefundable
even if the consumer prevail[s] at the arbitration. Consumers [may] incur
travel expenses disproportionate to the damages sought [and] ... bear the
cost of Gateway's legal fees if the consumer did not prevail at the
arbitration .... Also, although Chicago was designated as the site of the
actual arbitration, all correspondence must be sent to ICC headquarters in
France.53
Clearly these are significant legal terms that were buried either intentionally
or inadvertently in a generic arbitration clause.54 Further, these terms tend to
advantage the larger, more sophisticated institutional player by discouraging
consumer claims.
So unlike the "Rawlsian" situation that traditional arbitration anticipates,
large institutions, much like casinos, will calculate a house advantage, 55
51 See id.
52 Id.
53 Id
54 It is interesting to note that in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.
1997), Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court, considered only the enforceability of the
agreement to arbitrate in his opinion. The court did not address the rules, conditions, or
costs under which the arbitration would take place. See generally id. Yet, it ordered the
parties to arbitration.
55 With the sole exception of the game of Blackjack, most casino games start out
with a statistically measurable advantage to the casino (the "house advantage"); this
ensures that the casino will win in the long run. Cf. Mark T. Gould, Blackjack and the
Law, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Summer 1999, at 10, 10 (book review). Similarly,
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knowing ex ante that more likely than not they are going to be the defendant
in consumer litigation rather than the plaintiff.56 Some scholars contend that
under the modem arbitration paradigm, "individuals subject to arbitration
clauses in form contracts are indeed at a substantive disadvantage if
arbitration governs their disputes-i.e., arbitration does not protect their
interests as well as litigation would. '57 Finally, even if the arbitration is
conducted on a procedurally level playing field, the consumer may be denied
some legal remedies. For example, some arbitration clauses do not permit the
arbitrator to grant punitive damages, injunctive relief, attorney fees, or to
adjudicate "class actions. '58
At least one court, in Cole v. Burns International Security Services, has
considered the effect of repeat players on the resolution of statutory claims.59
While the court did acknowledge that there might be a problem in a situation
involving arbitrations between an employer (repeat players) and its
employees (one-shot players) in resolving Title VII claims, the court failed to
address adequately the concerns of the one-shot players.
Furthermore, [the court asserted that] there are several protections against
the possibility of arbitrators systematically favoring employers because
employers are the source of future business. For one thing, it is unlikely that
such corruption 60 would escape the scrutiny of plaintiffs' lawyers or
appointing agencies like the American Arbitration Association. Corrupt
arbitrators will not survive long in the business. In addition, wise employers
and their representatives should see no benefit in currying the favor of
institutional players can structure the arbitration so that they maximize the number of
cases they win while minimizing damages in the cases that they do lose.
56 Cf Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts and the Use of
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV.
223 (1998); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOc'Y REv. 95 (1974); Jeremy Senderowicz, Consumer
Arbitration and Freedom of Contract: A Proposal to Facilitate Consumer Informed
Consent to Arbitration Form Contracts, 32 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 275, 276-77
(1999).
57 Senderowicz, supra note 56, at 276-77.
5 8 Id. at277 & n.11.
59 See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1997). There
is also empirical evidence of the repeat player effect, at least in the statutory employment
discrimination arena. See generally Bingham, supra note 56. Professor Bingham's work
was based on the model established by Professor Mark Galanter in another area. There is
no reason why Professor Galanter's model should not work equally as well in modeling
the relationships between e-merchants and e-consumers. See id.
60 The issue is not necessarily corruption but merely subtle prejudice or bias for the
repeat player--or even asymmetrical knowledge by the repeat player that can be used to
the repeat player's advantage.
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corrupt arbitrators, because this simply will invite increased judicial review
of arbitral judgments. Finally, if the arbitrators who are assigned to hear and
decide statutory claims adhere to the professional and ethical standards set
by arbitrators in the context of collective bargaining, there is little reason for
concern.
61
The Cole court's facile manner of addressing these concerns does not
comport with the reality of one-shot player arbitration. For example, the
court assumed that one-shot players will have attorneys and that the arbitrator
will issue a reasoned written opinion that would be available to individuals
not before the court, i.e., "published." 62 Frequently, one-shot players appear
pro se or with relatively inexperienced attorneys who are themselves one-
shot players at representing individuals before arbitral tribunals. Second, the
court overestimated the likelihood that the institution supporting the
arbitration will discover these practices. Frequently, the bias will be subtle
and systemic to the situation. Why should an arbitral institution differ with an
arbitrator on the weight or credibility to be given to evidence or testimony?
Further, there is no evidence of any systemic "check and balance" system in
place at any arbitral institution to root out bias over numerous separate
arbitrations.6 Judges grant extreme deference to arbitral decisions.t Finally,
absent a reasoned award in each case,65 there is no basis on which to discover
systemic bias on the part of an arbitrator.66
61 Cole, 105 F.3d at 1485. But see generally Caroline E. Mayer, Win Some, Lose
Rarely?: Arbitration Forum's Rulings Called One-Sided, WASHINGTON POST, Mar.
1, 2000 (questioning the impartiality of an arbitral institution that may be heavily
dependent on a single source or single industry for arbitral referrals and citing an
example where a financial institution won 99.6% of the cases (19,618 for the
financial institution versus 87 for consumers)).
62 Id.
63 The panel in Cole implicitly explains why an arbitral institution check system
is unlikely to work. The panel, when presented with survey evidence analyzing
numerous arbitrations, observed that "li]t is hard to know what to make of these
studies without assessing the relative merits of the cases in the surveys." Id.
Similarly even in the rare case of a reasoned award, it is hard to review the award for
bias without re-arbitrating the underlying dispute.
64 See First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995); see also Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427,436-37 (1953).
65 Arbitrators are generally not required to provide a written explanation or give
reasons for their awards. See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960). Arbitrators are required to provide written
explanation if the rules of the arbitral institution or the submission so require. See
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THn UNITED STATES
523 (1994). Historically, arbitrators issued bare awards to prevent challenges to the
arbitration award, to retain the simplicity and flexibility of arbitration, and to reduce
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C. Salutary Effect of Light on Arbitral Justice
As noted above, there are numerous problems arising from the
intersection of institutional arbitration, repeat players, and one-shot players.
Light will provide a salutary effect on the arbitral process; therefore, the first
step should be to re-examine privacy in the context of e-arbitration,
especially in disputes arising out of mass-market contracts. A mass-market
contract to which hundreds of thousands or even millions of individuals are a
party in a core fundamental sense takes on a character of more than just a
mere contract; there is an inherent public interest in the interpretation and
enforcement of the contract.67 Published reasoned awards when the public
interest so require.
1. Regulated Markets, Regulated Justice
Like every other commodity in cyberspace, there is a market for justice.
Many of the most successful commercial sites in cyberspace are those
creating a market. Such as, eBay and portal sites that implicitly lend their
credibility to the online merchants using their sites. One aspect of a well-
the costs of arbitration. See DAVID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION
PROCEDURE MANUAL § 13-13, (1994 & Supp. 1999) (discussing the pros and cons of
reasoned arbitral awards). The bare award is uncommon in international arbitrations.
Born, supra note 65, at 523.
66 As for the arbitrator's integrity and professionalism, the Author is second to none
in admiring the conscientious diligence of every arbitrator that he works with. Yet parties
should not rely solely on personal integrity when institutional checks and balances exist
and when countervailing passions may promote the same result. But, in the end, I
concede that personal integrity and professionalism is the ultimate safeguard.
67 Some commentators have the judicial public from the private by looking to
the functions of adjudication. See Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 31 (1979); Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers
and Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J.
ON DIsP. RESOL. 267, 321-22 (1995). Private disputes implicate private norms or the
application of public norms to private acts because these disputes only implicate the
interests of the immediate parties. See Fiss, supra, at 31. In contrast, public disputes
implicate the interests of society. See id. Does this formulation apply to the following
situation where the interpretation of a term for the dominant operating system license
could potentially affect 80% of the personal computer users throughout the world?
Clearly, it is a massive number of individual licensees (private norms), but
collectively its interpretation must rise to the level of implicating the interests of
society. While the parts the individual licenses are private, the whole is greater than
the sum of the private licenses and is thus public. This hybrid-public-private law
issue should be reported regardless of the dispute resolution options chosen by the
parties.
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regulated market is a consumer dispute resolution mechanism. Absent some
effective method of resolving consumer disputes, consumers either will
discount the value of their purchases to provide protection against the
perceived risk, buy some sort of insurance, or refuse to enter the market.
Alternatively, consumers will prefer and advantage those markets that are
viewed as "fair" or those that create other regulatory mechanisms. The credit
card industry has facilitated cyberspace as a market because it is the ultimate
insurer of many transactions its merchant agreements and charge-back
mechanisms. It is uncertain in the long run, however, that credit card issuers
will want to remain the dispute-resolvers of last resort for e-commerce.
It is clear that a perception of fairness adds value to a market. As the e-
market grows and shifts from informal dispute resolution or ad hoc
procedures, both the appearance of fairness and the reality of fairness must
be core values. 68 Already, the arbitral institutions are moving into the arena.
Both the Better Business Bureau and the American Arbitration Association
have promulgated cyberspace rules that are consumer friendly.69
2. Level the Playing Field by Providing Greater Informational
Symmetry
One of the most perplexing problems involved in creating or maintaining
a dispute resolution system is that the participants must view that system as
just. The system as a whole must satisfy some sense of equity on the part of
the participants. The parties must have equal access to the facts and rules that
have some bearing on their dispute. The decisionmaker must have some
accountability for the decision. The parties should be able to anticipate the
consequences of their actions and plan accordingly, and in a private
resolution system, to the degree that it creates externalities that affect the
larger public adjudication system, the public system should be on notice so
that it can plan accordingly. This subpart will discuss the importance of
informational symmetry.
a. Access Inequality
One reason why courts do not allow citation to unpublished opinions is
the fear that repeat litigants will develop an expertise in litigating before
68 There is much to be said for a market approach to this problem. Individuals
valuing fair dispute resolutions should pay any additional costs for access to better
dispute resolution mechanisms. Unfortunately, consumers tend not to value dispute
resolution until after the dispute has occurred.69 American Arbitration Association, Consumer Due Process Protocol (visited Apr.
20, 2000) <http://www.adr.org/education/education/consumer-protocol.html>.
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some judges such expertise is unavailable to future one-shot opponents who
may litigate similar issues without the resources to collect the information
used by repeat litigants to their advantage. 70 However, even without the
ability to cite to unpublished opinions, repeat players obtain the expertise,
they possess the reasoning contained in the unpublished awards, and they can
use it-in the world of state sponsored courts, they may use it without
citation, and in the world of arbitration, they are free to cite it as "precedent"
for whatever weight the arbitrator is willing to give it.7 1
While arbitrators generally are not required to follow precedent, an
arbitrator would be silly to ignore a prior well-reasoned arbitral award. 72 The
institutional repeat player, through its general counsel's office or through the
professional association representing that institutional player, will quickly
have access to a variety of arbitral awards73-a neat showcase of arbitral
awards formed under different circumstances that can be used in the
alternative to argue for or against any position the repeat player chooses to
take in each arbitration. The one-shot player has no such arsenal of arbitral
awards to choose from to cite as precedent for her position on interpreting the
contract.74 Accordingly, each and every award should be published75 and
7 0 See Kirt Shuldberg, Comment, Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished
Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CAL. L. REv. 541, 548, 550 (1997). The
counter-argument is that the parties possessing access to these decisions should be
banned from citing them or that the arbitrator is free to ignore them. The mere possession
provides the possessor with a roadmap to prior arbitral reasoning (or at least a bare
award) and therefore with disparate access. "Unfairness results from unequal access." Id
at 566.
71 Even in the judicial context in which the no-citation rule can be enforced
aggressively, this rule has been criticized severely by some commentators. See generally,
e.g., Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the
Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify the Means of Secrecy?, 50
S.C. L. REv. 235 (1998).
72 See JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 15.35, at 239 (2d ed.
1997) ("Past arbitration awards are not legally binding on an arbitrator, although they
may be influential.").
73 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees,
64 UMKC L. REv. 449, 477 (1996) ("[I]t is common for large organizations and law
firms that represent those organizations to keep databases containing extensive
background information on each potential arbitrator, including how the arbitrator ruled in
a number of cases as well as the quality of his decision.").
74 "A one-shot player who devoted any substantial time and resources to obtaining
information about arbitrators or developing relationships with them would, by contrast,
be acting irrationally because he would never have use for the information again." Sarah
Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the (Alternative) Forum:
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citable. To the degree humanly and technologically possible, the one-shot
players should have as much information as the repeat players.
b. Arbitrator Accountability
Reasoned awards and published awards go hand in hand with
legitimizing arbitration as a source of law on the Internet. The public
availability of arbitral awards is a check on arbitral abuse. Similar to judicial
decisionmaking, "the light of day helps not only to assure fairness in fact,
but, perhaps as importantly, to promote the appearance of fairness." 76 .
[R]easoned opinions [are] one means of imposing transparency on the
decision-making process and in particular, of imposing a certain self-
discipline on the decision makers themselves. This is the phenomenon in
which the... arbitrator supposedly finds-at the point where it becomes
necessary to turn inclination into reasoned judgment-that it simply 'will
not write.' Forced to think through the implications of [her] decision, [she]
may in the course of explanation be surprised to find that it is not internally
consistent, that it does not take into account all relevant interests, that it
overlooks authority or ignores factual complexities. '[W]hen institutional
designers have grounds for believing that decisions will systematically be
the product of bias, self-interests, insufficient reflection, or simply excess
haste requiring decision makers to have reasons may counteract some of
these tendencies. 7
7
If a reasoned award is issued, parties to the dispute are more likely to accept
the legitimacy of the award, and if the award is published and made public,
the public at large is more likely to develop confidence in the arbitral system.
Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. Rnv. 591, 623.
75Publication means different things in different contexts. For example,
publication may consist of just the bare facts, names of the parties, attorneys, and a
general statement of issues before the arbitrator, and the actual award. See, e.g.,
ROBBINS, supra note 65, § 13-10. The American Arbitration Association publishes
similar information with the names of the parties redacted. See id. at 587. The
preferred form of publication should include more than just a caption and a
judgment; publication should also include, in some form, the arbitrator's analysis of
the facts and law that support the award.
76 Shuldberg, supra note 70, at 567.
77 Rau, supra note 12, at 527-28. Published reasoned awards will assist in
keeping honest arbitrators honest, dishonest, disingenuous, or mendicant arbitrators
will merely have to invest additional time and intellectual capital in harmonizing the
award with the law and facts, and praying that they are not discovered.
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c. Private Planning
If business institutions and consumers are aware of the "law" or
persistent patterns of arbitral reasoning, they either may contract around this
line of analysis or explicitly adopt it. Further, with greater information, both
repeat players78 and consumers may decide which disputes to "litigate"
before the arbitrator and which to settle. If the governing rules are unsettled,
then predicting the value of the dispute and its value to settle is problematic.
This will lead to economically inefficient litigation.
d. State Planning
Arbitrators in e-commerce will be required to apply existing public law.
Frequently, the issue may be before the arbitrator before a state sponsored
court has had a chance to interpret the law in question or before the state
sponsored courts have settled the law. Without published awards, executive
agencies and legislatures will be unaware of the interpretations of, (and both
the intended and the unintended consequences), of public laws. Without the
information provided by the judiciary in the form of both statistics and
reasoned opinions interpreting the law, it is difficult to determine the true
effect of a law. Finally, to the degree that numerous private actions may
indicate a systemic problem that needs a larger social or political solution,
this barometer of public need is short-cutted by the private arbitral process.
3. Legitimize the Process and the Award
a. Costs
If parties to a dispute move into a private method for resolving disputes,
the old chestnut of "how much justice can you afford" takes on a new
resonance. Currently, a portion of the substantial cost of providing justice is
shifted from the litigants to the public at large. In e-commerce, private
dispute resolution becomes one more cost of doing business. In the real
world, consumers have easy access to inexpensive small claims courts for
minor disputes. As a general rule, consumers should not pay more in
arbitration costs than they would pay to litigate the same claim in a state
78 A few states, for example, California and Texas, already require some de
minimus disclosure. For example, California requires that the arbitrator disclose
prior arbitrations involving attorneys or parties to the present arbitration and the
results of the arbitration. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9 (West Supp. 1998); see
also TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 172.103 (West Supp. 1998).
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court.79 Although there is an inherent appearance of impropriety or bias,
large e-commerce institutions, especially those that create markets, should
contract for and subsidize dispute resolution services through independent
institutional administrators of arbitration services80 or agree to use
independent inexpensive services such as the Online Better Business Bureau.
b. Equality in Selecting an Arbitrator
Published awards are an excellent start in providing the one-shot player
some opportunity to make a reasoned decision on who would be the best
arbitrator for her claim. This includes information that may be useful in
discovering bias or the appearance of impropriety.
4. May Result in a Customary Law of Cyberspace
"Courts, through their opinions, serve two paramount social functions:
resolving disputes and enriching the supply of legal rules." 8' Arbitral awards
already serve the first social function, resolving disputes. Should state courts
fail to serve these purposes in cyberspace, arbitral opinions may have to
begin to serve the latter purpose of "enriching the supply of legal rules." In
order to serve this important purpose, they need to be well-reasoned and
published. Before an arbitrator relies on precedent to resolve a dispute, she
should be convinced that all relevant "precedent" is before her, not merely a
skewed sample. The only way to do this is to publish reasoned awards on
unsettled issues.
79 See generally Leslie L. Gardner, Note, Resolving the Conflict Between Arbitration
Clauses and Claims Under Unfair and Deceptive Practices Acts, 64 B.U. L. REV. 377
(1984).
80 The California Supreme Court's decision in Engalla v. Permanente Medical
Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997), teaches us the importance of independent
administration of arbitrations. Even if the e-commerce institutions select outside
arbitral institutions to administrate the arbitration of dispute resolutions, the shared
volume of revenue that one large e-merchant" could potentially generate for a single
arbitral institution is sufficient for many consumers to question the institution's
continuing impartiality. See generally Mayer, supra note 61. If the arbitral institution
is dependent on a few sources for much of its income, this could have at least the
appearance of impropriety and may weaken the legitimacy of the arbitral process and
the result in the challenging of the arbitral award. See, e.g, Engalla, 938 P.2d at 923-
24 ("Contractual arrangements for non-judicial resolution of disputes must possess
minimum levels of integrity.").
81 Shuldberg, supra note 56, at 548 (citing MELvIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATuRE
OFTHE COMMON LAW 4 (1988)).
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V. WHEN TO PUBLISH
Clearly articulated standards of when to publish an award and when not
to are needed. If the arbitration involves issues unique to individuals then
there may be a presumption that the arbitrator would follow the expressed
wishes of the parties in deciding whether to publish the award. But, if the
parties cannot agree that the award should be confidential, or if the arbitrator
finds that there is a competing public interest in disclosure, then the arbitrator
or the institution supporting the arbitration must make an independent
judgment as to whether the award should be published. 82
There are many factors that will enter into a decision as to whether to
publish an award. First and foremost, the arbitrator's discretion should be
guided by the rules of the institution supporting the arbitration. These rules
do not have to be extensive or even mandatory, but the arbitrator should have
guidance in making his decision on whether to publish. It will be impossible
to provide for every contingency that may arise or that may need to be
addressed in deciding whether to publish an award, but some ethical
principles must be created that instruct the arbitrator that she has an ethical
duty in making this determination to the public at large in addition to the
duty that the arbitrator and the institution supporting the arbitration have to
the parties to the dispute.
The United States Courts of Appeals have promulgated local rules to
guide individual judges and panel decisions on whether to publish an
opinion.83 These rules serve as useful starting points to assist arbitrators,
parties, and arbitral institutions in deciding whether to "publish" an award.
The rules for the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia provide a useful example of these rules.
An opinion, memorandum, or other statement explaining the basis for
the court's action in issuing an order or judgment shall be published if it
meets one or more of the following criteria: [the case resolves a substantial
legal issue]; it is a case of first impression or the first case to present the
issue in this court; it alters, modifies, or significantly clarifies a rule of law
previously announced by the court; it calls attention to an existing rule of
law that appears to have been generally overlooked; it criticizes or questions
existing law; it resolves an apparent conflict in decisions within the circuit
82 The default rule should be, "when in doubt, publish." Rarely will there be a
significant public interest in confidentiality in a mass-market e-commerce dispute. The
arbitrator may always redact identifying information from the opinion accompanying the
published award or just publish the award without any text explaining the underlying
dispute.
83 See, e.g., D.C. Cia. CT. APP. R. 36.
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or creates a conflict with another circuit; [or] it warrants publication in light
of other factors that give it general public interest.84
This provides a sound basis for an initial screening of arbitral awards.
Awards may be accompanied by a written opinion of the arbitrator
explaining the award or a bare award may be published. The bare award
would be, in essence, just the "judgment" of the arbitrator without
explanation of the issues or reasoning of the arbitrator.
But there needs to be some process by which third parties who are aware
of the award may suggest to parties and the arbitrator aware of the public
interest in the award. Accordingly, a rule similar to that which follows may
be in order:
Any person may, by motion made within 30 days after judgment or, if a
timely motion for rehearing is made, within 30 days after action thereon,
request that an unpublished opinion be published. Motions filed out of time
shall not be considered unless good cause is shown. Motions for publication
shall be based upon one or more of the criteria listed in subsection (a). 85
VI. WHERE TO PUBLISH
Actually, this is a simple question.86 Already law librarians and
researchers are considering the issues raised by digital publication;87 as
society develops more experience researching with and citing digital
documents, these issues will be resolved. The Internet is a publication
device.88 Arbitral awards could be posted on the website of the institution
that sponsored the arbitration in the case of institutional arbitration and on
the website of the arbitrator in the case of ad hoc arbitration. Of course, the
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 1 assume that there will be a market for these awards and that the market will
provide the incentive for publication. But because the volume of these awards may make
it difficult or expensive to publish in the traditional bound volume form, I am anticipating
digital publication.
87 See C. Anne Crocker, The Official Version: Authenticating, Preserving and Citing
Legal Information in Digital Form, 26 INT'L J. LEGAL INFo. 23, 26 (1998) (discussing the
following issues: (1) "the authentication of digital documents"; (2) "the preservation of
digital information"; and (3) "the development of a standard, vendor-neutral citation
system applicable to any format or media, past, present, or future").88 Initially, this system may appear to be susceptible to fraud. The judicious use of
encryption technology, however, may solve the problem: digital signatures and digital
watermarks will create self-authenticating published arbitral awards. See Section of
Science and Tech. Info. Sec. Comm., American Bar Ass'n, Digital Signature Guidelines
Tutorial (visited Apr. 8, 2000) <http://www.abanet.orglscitechlec/isc/dsg-tutorial.html>.
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parties and arbitrator always should be free to post the arbitral award on their
respective websites. Eventually, individuals and institutions will begin
collecting either the awards themselves or URLs to the awards and
consolidating this data for the ease of researchers. 89 Ultimately, a few
authoritative sources for arbitral awards will exist and become the preferred
(although not the only) sources for this data.90 Finally, by disbursing the
sources of information about arbitral awards, we avoid the contentious issues
of who owns the collective arbitral law of e-commerce and how to facilitate
access to it.91
Attorneys and others are already going to the ICANN Search for
Proceedings web page92 to try to gain some advantage in selecting which of
the three dispute resolution providers' arbitration panels have been
"historically" sympathetic of a given position. At this time, the paucity of
arbitral awards, the varying fact patterns, and the number of arbitrators
makes this a fruitless effort. But this does lead to two interesting questions
regarding the use of these databases: how will the "publisher" of the arbitral
awards index them and which search options will the publisher make
available to the public? Depending on how the databases are established,
users may or may not be able to use high-level statistical analysis across
institutions, individual arbitrators, or arbitral panels in search of a house
advantage. As the search engines become more sophisticated, this will
become an invaluable resource for consumers to level the playing field.
89 Although initially this ad hoc process sounds strange to attorneys practicing in the
United States, where there is a defined and delineated hierarchy of reporters, in other
parts of the world the compilation of reporters was left largely to the discretion of the
parties before the court or parties potentially interested in the outcome of the litigation
and was done on an ad hoc basis. See generally Burton M. Atkins, Selective Reporting
and the Communication of Legal Rights in England, 76 JUDICATURE 58 (1992).
90 Already, there are portal sites that aggregate (and sometimes vet) the URLs to
relevant sites. Some of these sites also publish the full text of documents. Unfortunately,
these sites are frequently transitory. Although the site may appear to be sponsored by a
major institution, in reality, frequently these sites are merely the pet projects of individual
employees and may not be maintained when the supporting employee moves on to other
projects, changes employment, or faces other time constraints.
91 See generally Deborah Tussey, Owning the Law: Intellectual Property Rights
in Primary Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173 (1998). The
intellectual property issues surrounding publishing arbitral opinions in a global
context are remarkably complex. This Article does not address these issues except to
reiterate that there is a strong public interest in the publication and distribution of
arbitral awards.
92 See ICANN Search for Proceedings Under the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (May 5, 2000) <http://www.icann.org/cgi-bin/udrp/
udrp.cgi>.
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Creators of arbitral award databases should include, in addition to Boolean
search capability, word frequency, and intelligent natural language queries.
Further, the rules or syntax of the search should be intuitive, transparent, and
whenever possible be similar to those used by popular search engines.
VII. CONCLUSION
Privacy in online arbitration is technologically possible, but public policy
considerations may compel the evolution of arbitration in the online
environment to an open online arbitration process. Arbitration in cyberspace
may serve a role more akin to that of the existing state courts. For many,
particularly consumers, it may be the primary or even only means of dispute
resolution. If arbitration is to serve the needs of global e-commerce, it may
need to evolve and to serve functions other than merely resolving the dispute
of the parties before the arbitrator. Arbitration must serve the important
public purpose of creating law and legitimizing the process of resolving
disputes. If it is to serve that function, then the process, the award, and the
reasoning behind the award must be transparent, as they must if they are to
be accepted and respected as legitimate by the skeptical e-commerce
community. Absent such transparency, arbitration is unlikely to create a
coherent, consistent, and cogent body of customary law respected by both
merchants, and consumers. Instead, online arbitration will be viewed with
distrust by consumers, who do not understand it, and with disdain by e-
merchants who have the sophistication to game the arbitral system. The
situation will remain until online arbitration fixes itself or the nation-states
intervene to protect the growth of e-commerce.

